The incoming State Secretary Marco Rubio rejected the liberal world order – in favor of Trump’s belief in America First. Rubio said: The postwar global order is not just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us. How do you read this and what does it mean for the world if the US will act according to Rubio’s words? Is this the end of the world as we know it? Read a few comments. If you enjoy what I do, please support me on Ko-fi! Thank you.
Michael Mosser, Director, Center for European Studies, Associate Professor of Instruction, University of Texas at Austin
As you are very well aware, the incoming Trump Administration poses significant interpretative challenges for analysts of international relations and foreign policy, precisely because of comments such as this one from the soon-to-be-confirmed Secretary of State.
In many ways, Senator Rubio’s comment is not controversial. There are many on both the right and the left who have fundamental issues with the postwar international/global order. Concerns that the international order is failing both citizens and the states to which they belong are wide-ranging: from the hollowing out of industrial heartlands to the rise of an oligarchic class of multi-billionaires able to exert influence over nation-states, to the exploitation of loopholes in the global trade or international security regime. We see the reaction to the “unfairness” of the international order playing out not just in the United States, but also in Europe, including in your home country. This trend is unlikely to diminish anytime soon, and in fact will likely grow stronger in the near to medium term.
The big question is what happens next. Will the decreasing confidence in the ability of the international order to achieve meaningful gains for citizens or nation-states lead to a further erosion of rules and norms which have governed the world for the last 80 years? Will we revert to a more isolationist course of action, with nation-states turning inward, despite the consensus that isolationism leads to economic decline? For me, I think there will be a shift in that direction, but the world of 2025 is not that of 1925. Structures in place, both economic and security, are far more entrenched and more deeply intertwined than those that existed before. It is probable that there will be difficult conversations between the US and Europe (both NATO and the EU) over the role the US will play going forward. It is also probable that China will continue to promote its alternative vision for a new global order. How receptive the global South (and parts of Europe) are to this message remains to be seen, but if the recent past is any indication, the ideological shift in many parts of the world toward what might be called the “authoritarian capitalist” model will continue, and perhaps accelerate.
All this is to say that, while I don’t think it’s “the end of the world as we know it,” it certainly may be the end of *this* particular version of the world. Every era brings with it attendant changes and challenges, and the second Trump era is no different in that regard.
David McCuan, Professor, School of Social Sciences, Sonoma State University
This is a key moment in world affairs and arguably a time that is the most fragile we have seen since the period right after 9/11.
As the Biden administration departs and the revised and re-energized Trump Administration 2.0 returns, we are at an inflection point for America’s role in the world. The Axis of the Aggrieved (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) are emboldened despite recent setbacks and challenges. For the United States, having a policy of “America First” translates to “America Alone.”
This harms our friends in Europe and NATO; harms our alliances across Asia and the Middle East; and gives all allies and friends pause as they radically reassess our commitment to previous security guarantees (Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines as just recent examples), while others take stock of which way to turn (Ukraine, India, even our NATO friends).
This statement by our next Secretary of State (he will be confirmed) – is a moment and unique view into a world where diplomacy alone will be unable to do the harm of America going solo. That “go it alone” approach will go far beyond tariffs against trading partners or assistance with strings to Ukraine and others.
This approach will undo almost 80 years of America’s approach to a post-World War II world. It was in July 1947 that the famous “X” article was published laying out the stakes.
Those stakes are higher and more multi-pronged in aggression against the United States than they have been in the last twenty years.
This isn’t the time to walk away from alliances as a key element rooted in common security arrangements for collective protection, security, and competition.
The approach laid out by the Secretary-designate is a tipping point of America going alone and laying out for all to see the bankruptcy of such an approach.
Eugene Gholz, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame
These are very big questions! It is not surprising, though, that the incoming Trump administration wants to draw a sharp rhetorical contrast with the Biden administration, which very publicly defended the liberal international order. Rubio was simply explaining something that we all already knew: it is unlikely that the Trump administration will do anything because the liberal international order calls for it. People who like the idea of the liberal international order believe that participating in that order is good for the United States — that following the liberal order does put America first, although they don’t use those particular words. Trump and his supporters frame the conversation the other way, starting with American interests, or, in other words, putting America First.
Beyond that rhetorical issue, I think it is clear that the Trump administration, and Rubio in particular, think that many of the liberal aspects of the liberal international order are actively bad for American interests. The core of economic liberalism internationally has been free trade, and Trump and Rubio (and, in fact, Biden) thinks that free trade is bad for the United States; Trump and Rubio prefer high tariffs, American industrial policy, and less international trade. So of course they think the liberal international order is obsolete and works against the United States.
The liberal international order also includes a commitment to following rules and procedures set by international organizations, again, most prominently in trade through the World Trade Organization. Many Republicans have been skeptical of international institutions. In the new administration, President Trump seems skeptical of anyone else “telling the United States what to do,” so he doesn’t want to follow decisions made by institutions that are part of the liberal international order; Marco Rubio as a senator was openly skeptical of international institutions for a different reason that seems less connected to Trump’s views. Specifically Rubio thinks international institutions are illegitimate because they give equal weight to the voice (and votes) of sovereign foreign countries that are not democratic — that is, Rubio has been a strong supporter of a human rights agenda and mocks things like the UN Human Rights Council where dictators get to claim they are part of the global human rights institutions. Trump and Rubio can agree that the institutional component of the liberal international order is bad for the United States. And so you get stated hostility to the liberal international order in the confirmation testimony.
If the United States does impose high tariffs along the lines that Trump has talked about, that will change things a good bit. I doubt that the institutions are that important in actual policy outcomes, and truthfully, even the Biden administration undermined the more important institutions like the WTO, so if the main feature of the new administration’s deviation from the liberal international order is in its commitment to the institutions, that will not come close to ending the world as we know it; it will mostly be more of the same.
Thomas Scotto, Head of the Department, Professor of Government and Politics, University of Strathclyde
Rubio’s comments reflect deep scepticism toward the multilateral order and the very institutions that the United States played a significant role in developing. Rather than ensuring global stability, President-elect Trump and his Cabinet nominees view organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) as imposing undue constraints on U.S. sovereignty. Trump also harbours a strong belief that America’s allies exploit these institutions to gain advantages, particularly in trade balances, at the expense of the United States.
If the incoming Trump administration follows through on this rhetoric, multilateral institutions could weaken significantly. Many of these organizations have depended on American leadership—both its economic and military power—since their inception in the post-World War II era. A U.S. retreat from its role as the primary upholder of the liberal international order could create a power vacuum, one that China may be well-positioned to exploit.
However, the decline of the liberal order is not a foregone conclusion, even with the America First movement at what some perceive as the height of its influence. Other countries may step up to fill the void left by an American retreat. Alternatively, the global system could transition toward multipolarity, with leadership divided among competing regional powers, including China, Russia, the European Union, and potentially India.
The most concerning scenario would be a world fragmented by competitive nationalism, widespread protectionism, and frequent military conflicts. Such a breakdown of the international order would represent the most severe challenge to global stability, trade, and peace.
Roman Gerodimos, Professor of Global Current Affairs, Bournemouth University
It is true that the postwar and post-Cold War world order has been obsolete for a while now. Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China have been weaponising the international system against the West for many years now. So, all that is to an extent true but not for the reasons that Marco Rubio is suggesting.
The actions of successive US administrations have been by far the main driver of that change. After 9/11 they engaged in misguided campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. They facilitated globalisation and the rise of China, which ended up hurting US industry, jobs and the middle class. And domestically they allowed their political and media system to become polarised and fragmented to the point of collapse. Finally, it is their own big tech corporations that cannibalised the institutions of liberal democracy through smartphones and social media. So collectively these four factors have damaged US soft power, as well as the resilience of liberal democracies.
It is true that creative thinking is needed to address the security challenges facing us, and one could interpret Trump’s provocations (about Greenland, Panama and Canada) as part of that game, of the broader reshuffling of the global deck of cards. But at the same time, such statements weaken NATO and make US allies more vulnerable to intervention by China and Russia.
Garret Martin, Senior Professorial Lecturer, Co-Director Transatlantic Policy Center, School of International Service, American University
Senator Rubio’s quote, namely that ‘The postwar global order is not just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us”, is certainly quite dramatic. But if one takes a closer look, it is not so obvious that this is such a consequential or impactful claim. First, and if confirmed, how influential will Marco Rubio actually be in the making of US foreign policy? He is not part of the Trump inner circle and precedent suggests that the White House will have a tight control over foreign policy. So Rubio’s words may be just that, words…
Second, the rest of his opening remarks are more conventional and mostly parrot the main pillars of America First (prioritize US interests and the world tries to advantage of our generosity) and Peace through Strength.
Third, while the global order is undoubtedly contested, from within the US and from the outside, is it really obsolete? And is that what the US under Trump really desires? Trump seems perfectly content to keep the dollar as the main world reserve currency, and to continue to spend significant amounts on US defense, two core pillars of the current order.
And finally, it is fine and dandy to bemoan the current order, but what exactly should replace it? Rubio speaks of the fact that the US “are called to create a free world out of chaos once again” and that “this will not be easy”. He is certainly right about the second point, but it would help to have a clear vision of what a new order should look like before assembling it.
Filed under: Global Politics, Politics, Security, United States, US foreign policy, US politics | Tagged: Donald Trump, Foreign policy, Global Politics, Politics, Security, United States, US foreign policy, US politcs |